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UNASKED (AND UNANSWERED) QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ROLE 
OF NEUROIMAGING IN THE CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCESS 
Michael L. Perlin, J.D. and Valerie R. McClain, Psy.D. 
The robust neuroimaging debate has dealt mostly with philosophical 
questions about free will, responsibility, and the relationship between brain 
abnormalities, violence and crime. This debate, however, obscures several 
important issues of criminal procedure to which little attention has as of yet 
been paid: 1) an indigent defendant's right of access to expert testimony in 
cases where neuroimaging tests might be critical, 2) a defendant's compe-
tency to consent to the imposition of a neuroimaging test; and 3) the impact 
of antipsychotic medications on a defendant's brain at the time that such a 
test is performed. This article will consider these questions from the per-
spectives of both law and neuropsychology, and, from a clinical perspective, 
will also focus on 1) identifying cases appropriate for referrals for neuroi-
maging studies, including preliminary testing based on neuropsychological 
assessment; 2) understanding the importance of brain impairment as relates 
to criminality and violence; 3) establishing criteria for determining compe-
tency to consent to such tests, and 4) the potential impact of medications on 
brain .functioning when neuroimaging tests are conducted. 
In writing about neuroimaging and the law in the insanity defense con-
text, one of the authors (MLP) has p~eviously sought to balance jurors' likely 
positive response to the perceived characteristics of this evidence-vivid, 
objective, quantifiable, advanced (1)--with their likely negative response to 
the use of this evidence in such cases (reflecting their prejudice, hostility, 
and hatred toward insanity pleaders) (1), concluding that he was "not at all 
sure that the pizzazz of neuroimaging testimony-not withstanding its color-
fulness and its propensity to reductionism-will trump these deep-seated 
attitudes" (1, p. 911). The science of neuroscience thus has to be assessed in 
the sociopolitical context of the specific question of law that is central to the 
specific case before the court. 
Neuroimaging is "fraught with uncertainties" (2, p. 266, n. 155). The 
steps used in the production and presentation of neuroimaging evidence are 
Copyright 2010 American Journal of Forensic Psychology, Volume 28, Issue 4. The Journal is a 
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"not only ... not standardized, they are easily manipulated by a person with the 
knowledge of the technology" (3). It is clear is that the existence of neuroi-
maging techniques has changed the contours of the playing field, and no 
matter which side of the divide we find ourselves on, we must acknowledge 
that reality. 
With this backdrop, we focus on the question of what impact neuroi-
maging evidence will likely have on a series of "criminal procedure situa-
tions," the resolutions of which are inextricably intertwined with pre-existing 
socio-political views and attitudes of judges and jurors: 
• the implications of U.S. Supreme Court decisional law on deter-
mining an indigent defendant's access to expert testimony in 
cases where neuroimaging tests might be critical, 
• the defendant's competency to consent to the imposition of a 
neuroimaging test or examination; and 
• the impact of medications-specifically, antipsychotic medica-
tions-on a defendant's brain at the time that such a test is per-
formed (4). 
We will also consider these issues from a clinical perspective, fo-
cusing on 
• identifying cases appropriate for referrals for neuroimaging 
studies, including preliminary testing based on neuropsychologi-
cal assessment; 
• understanding the importance of brain impairment as relates to 
criminality and violence; 
• establishing criteria for determining competency to consent to 
such tests, and 
• the potential impact of medications on brain functioning when 
neuroimaging tests are conducted. 
The article will proceed in this manner. First, we will briefly restate 
some of the conclusions from the earlier article previously mentioned, dis-
cussing the tensions inherent in the ways that jurors construe such evidence 
in insanity defense cases. Then, we will look at each of the three core crimi-
nal procedure issues: the right to a neuroimaging expert, the standards of as-
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY, VOLUME 28, ISSUE 4, 2010/7 
sessing consent to the administration of neuroimaging testing, and the impli-
cations of the administration of antipsychotic, neuroleptic medication to the 
findings of the neuroimaging examiner. Then, we will consider these issues 
from clinical vantage points. After that, we will offer some conclusions, and 
speculate as to what our answers to these more narrow questions have for the 
larger neuroimaging-and-the-law "picture." 
THE AMBIGUITIES AND AMBIVALENCES OF NEUROIMAGING EVIDENCE 
Although commentators bravely assert that neuroscience seems "ad-
vanced enough to enter forensic psychiatry" (5, p. 115), that "advances in 
neurobiological research methods allow one to address the nature and bio-
logical basis of human behavior" (6, p. 131), that jurors can be counted on to 
critically evaluate such evidence (7), a cluster of other factors forces us to 
think seriously about how neuroimaging evidence will be construed by fact-
finders . In a recent article, one of us (MLP) identified these factors as "visu-
alization, reductionism, the attribution heuristic, and the impact of a belief in 
'the CSI effect.'" (1, pp. 893-894). By "visualization," I referred to the ways 
that the visual "allure" can "dazzle" and "seduce" jurors in ways that are "in-
appropriately persuasive" (8, p. 243). By "reductionism," I referred to the 
ways that neuroimaging testimony has the meretricious capacity to "re-
duce ... psychosocial complexity" (8, p. 248). By "the attribution heuristic," I 
referred to the way that we seek to attribute human behavior, in the words of 
Laura Khoshbin and Shahram Khoshbin (9, p. 182), "to a physical source in 
the head." And by the "CSI effect," I referred to the way that we believe that 
jurors demand the "money shot" of hard forensic evidence in all trials, even 
though valid and reliable evidence as to the reality of that belief "is scant" 
(10). 
This remains, in the end, an area fraught with ambiguity and contradic-
tion. 
QUESTIONS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Right to an Expert 
The majority of criminal defendants are indigent. Neuroimaging testing 
is expensive, and is more expensive in cases in which the examined defen-
dant is in jail awaiting trial. The question is relatively simple: does the de-
fendant have a right to an independent neuroimaging expert in insanity cases 
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or other criminal trial matters, including, but not limited to, incompetency to 
stand trial proceedings, sentencing hearings, and inquiries into mental status 
in instances where the difference in gradations of a crime may be of great 
significance as a correlation of exposure to a specific punishment? (4). 
The Implications of the Ake Case. Nearly 25 years ago, the U.S. Su-
preme Court addressed the question of a .defendant's right to an expert in a 
criminal trial. In Ake v. Oklahoma, a death penalty case, the Supreme Court 
ruled that an indigent criminal defendant who makes a threshold showing 
that insanity is likely to be a significant factor at trial is constitutionally enti-
tled to a psychiatrist's assistance (11, p. 74). The Court observed that it had 
"long recognized that when a State brings its judicial power to bear on an 
indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take steps to insure that 
the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his defense. This principle, 
grounded in the due process clause's guarantee of "fundamental fairness," 
derives from the belief "that justice cannot be equal when, simply as a result 
of his poverty, a defendant is denied the opportunity to participate meaning-
fully in a judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at stake" (11, pp. 75, 77). 
The Court set out what it perceived as the role of the psychiatrist in such 
cases: 
[P]sychiatrists gather facts, both through professional examina-
tion, interviews, and elsewhere, that they will share with the judge or 
jury; they analyze the information gathered and from it draw plausi-
ble conclusions about the defendant's mental condition, and about 
the effects of any disorder on behavior at the time in question. They 
know the probative questions to ask of the opposing party's psychia-
trists and how to interpret their answers. Unlike lay witnesses, who 
can merely describe symptoms they believe might be relevant to the 
defendant's mental state, psychiatrists can identify the "elusive and 
often deceptive" symptoms of insanity, Solesbee v. Balkcom, 399 
U.S. 9, 12 (1950), and tell the jury why their observations are rele-
vant. Further, where permitted by evidentiary rules, psychiatrists can 
translate a medical diagnosis into language that will assist the trier of 
the fact, and therefore offer evidence in a form that has meaning for 
the task at hand. Through this process of investigation, interpretation 
and testimony, psychiatrists ideally assist lay jurors, who generally 
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have no training in psychiatric matters, to make a sensible and edu-
cated determination about the medical condition of the defendant at 
the time of the offense (11, p. 80). 
It further concluded: 
I_W]ithout the assistance of a psychiatrist to conduct a professional 
examination on issues relevant to the defense, to help determine 
whether the insanity defense is viable, to present testimony, and to 
assist in preparing the cross-examination of a State's psychiatric wit-
nesses, the risk of an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is ex-
tremely high. With such assistance, the defendant is fairly able to 
present at least enough information to the jury, in a meaningful man-
ner, as to permit it to make a sensible determination (11, p. 82). 
As the risk of error from denial of such assistance is highest "when the 
defendant's mental condition is seriously in question," the defendant would 
thus qualify for such assistance when he is able to make an "ex parte thresh-
old showing ... that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his de-
fense." The Court thus held that, when a defendant is able to demonstrate 
that his sanity was such a "significant factor," the state must "assure the de-
fendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate 
examination and assist in evaluation, preparation and presentation of the de-
fense" (11, p. 83). 
Subsequent Developments After Ake. The courts have generally read Ake 
narrowly, and have refused to require appointment of an expert unless it is 
"absolutely essential to the defense" (12, p. 802). By way of examples, 
courts have split on whether there is a right to an expert psychologist to per-
form psychological testing under Ake. On this point, compare Jones v. State 
( 13) (rejecting defendant's request for additional psychological evaluation; 
limiting Ake to psychiatrists) and Hough v. State (14) (no right under Ake to 
appointment of social psychologist to help in jury selection) to Funk v. 
Commonwealth (15) (rejecting defendant's argument that psychiatric assis-
tance is mandated under Ake; no error to appoint clinical psychologist) and 
King v. State (16) (appointment of psychologist sufficient under state stat-
ute). Without citing Ake, another court rejected an application for the right to 
the appointment of a social psychologist to aid in jury selection (Wallace v. 
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State [17]). Ake, on the other hand, was relied on so as to require the ap-
pointment of a pathologist in a criminal case (Rey v. State [18]). On the per-
haps closer question of the requirement of the appointment of a DNA expert, 
after an intermediate appellate court in Virginia relied on Ake to require the 
appointment of such an expert, that decision was subsequently vacated, with 
no discussion of Ake in the subsequent opinion. See Husske v. Common-
wealth (19); compare District Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. 
Osborne (20) (convicted prisoner had no constitutional right to release of 
certain biological evidence so that it could be subjected to DNA testing). 
In his exhaustive survey article about the implementation of Ake, Profes-
sor Paul Giannelli (21, p. 1418) points out, in a slightly different context, that 
"in 1985, the Ake Court could not have anticipated how the advent of DNA 
evidence would revolutionize forensic science." Nor, of course, could it have 
anticipated the new significance of neuroimaging evidence. To this point in 
time, however, lower courts have been generally reluctant to extend Ake to 
requests for funding for neuroimaging tests. In Bates v. State (22), no Ake 
violation was found where a defendant sought additional expert assistance in 
establishing functional organic brain damage, and in Smith v. Kearney (23), 
there was no Ake error where defendant sought funds for a PET scan. Al-
though the court in Walker v. Oklahoma (24) found that it was Ake error to 
fail to provide funds for additional neurological testing "to flesh out the eti-
ology [of the defendant's] mental illness" (25, p. 1236), it deemed that error 
harmless. On the other hand, People v. Jones (26) did reverse a conviction 
because of the lower court's refusal to fund brain scans. 
The Likely Response of Jurors. The constitutional analysis here cannot 
be undertaken without serious consideration of likely juror response to the 
glitter of neuroimaging evidence, what Dean Mobbs (as cited in 27, p. 299) 
has called the "Christmas tree phenomenon" in writing about the seductive-
ness of this evidence. "Jurors may be so dazzled by the 'pretty lights' that 
they would not pay sufficient attention to the expert's interpretation of what 
the picture means" (27, p. 300). Certainly, this analysis argues persuasively 
for an expansive reading of Ake and its progeny. 
The need for this expansive reading is heightened because insanity de-
fense cases are so often so utterly dissonant with jurors' flawed "ordinary 
common sense" (OCS) (28, pp. 22-33), referring to a "self-referential and 
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non-reflective" way of constructing the world "I see it that way, therefore 
everyone sees it that way; I see it that way, therefore that's the way it is" (1, 
p. 899 n. 96). How well can lawyers cross-examine experts on these sophisti-
cated questions of science where the dazzle of the proffered evidence makes 
the expression of skepticism about such evidence equally dissonant from ju-
rorOCS? 
Competency to Consent 
The question of competency has, historically, "been a constant element 
in Anglo-American law" (29, p. 2). For most of this time, the focus has been 
solely on questions of competency to stand trial. In 1960 and 1966, the Su-
preme Court constitutionalized the prevailing common law standards in this 
area both in the context of both substantive and procedural due process 
(Dusky v. United States [30]; Pate v. Robinson [31]). 
Criminal Law Precedent. More recently, the Court ruled, in Godinez v. 
Moran (32) that the same minimalist standard articulated in Dusky as to 
matters of trial competency also applied in inquiries regarding defendants' 
competency to plead guilty and/or to waive counsel, although, subsequently, 
it backed off this position a bit, finding in Indiana v. Edwards (33) that the 
Constitution permits states to insist upon representation by counsel for those 
who are competent enough to stand trial but who still suffer from severe 
mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial pro-
ceedings by themselves (34). 
Other courts have considered questions of criminal competency in a host 
of other pretrial (confessions, search and seizures, line-ups), trial Uury waiv-
ers, evidentiary objections, impact of incompetency finding on ability to en-
ter insanity plea) and post-trial (motion for new trial, sentencing, parole or 
probation hearing) settings, but these cases all seem to have been decided in 
"n of 1" universes without reference to or consideration of what other courts 
had decided in analogous (or even in identical) areas of the law (35). 
Mostly lost to the pages of history are the barely remembered cases of 
Mackey v. Procunier (36) and Knecht v. Gillman (37). These earlier 
cases-ones that dealt with the use of medication as a tool of negative be-
havior modification/operant conditioning purposes (38)-also raised issues 
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arising under the First and Eighth Amendments (39, §§ 3B-4.1 to 4.2, pp. 
171-179). 
We refer to those opinions here because we think they may potentially 
illuminate some of the issues we need to consider when we weigh what we 
see as a critical (but virtually never discussed) criminal procedure issue: what 
are the criteria for assessing whether a criminal defendant is competent to 
consent to neuroimaging testing? Commentators have argued that, for certain 
purposes, neuroimaging tests may run afoul of the privilege against self-
incrimination and substantive due process (40-43). Commentators have also 
disagreed on the possible application of the Fourth Amendment to admissi-
bility questions involving evidence of such testing (43, pp. 195-198 
[Amendment inapplicable]; 44 [Amendment applicable]). 
The Invasiveness of Neurolmaging Tests 
Although such tests are not physically invasive in the same ways that 
injectible antipsychotic medication is invasive or that nausea-inducing drugs 
are invasive, a strong parallel argument can be made, we contend, that such 
testing, involving measurement of brain functioning, for purposes of consti-
tutional analysis, is invasive. We argue that it is invasive because it can 
lead-directly and inexorably-to negative outcomes for the person being 
tested, and, as such, inevitably raises the substantive cluster of competency 
questions implicated by involuntary medication practices. We know that 
there is no unitary standard of competency and that the bodies of case law 
and commentaries that have evolved in questions of criminal, mental disabil-
ity and private civil law are maddeningly inconsistent (45, p. 283). We are 
not suggesting here that we can resolve these multiple dilemmas in this con-
text; rather, we simply want to call attention to this issue as one that must be 
"on the table" for future discussions. 
THE IMPACT OF MEDICATION 
The Effects of Antipsychotic Drugs on Brain Functioning 
Seven years ago, in an article about brain imaging and the law, Dr. Don-
ald Reeves and his associates (3, p. 92) stressed that "psychotropic drugs af-
fect functional imaging of the brain," and that the effects of such drugs "are 
not always short-lived." Given the reality that the Supreme Court-in estab-
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lishing its jurisprudence of the right-to-refuse-psychotropic-drug-treatment-
has stressed that "the pervasiveness of side effects is a key factor in the de-
termination of the scope of the right" (46, p. 736), it comes as a surprise that 
this insight has not, as of yet, been discussed elsewhere in the legal literature. 
Again, especially in cases that involve individuals institutionalized against 
their will in matters that involve the criminal trial process, it is reasonable to 
predict that this will be the subject of important future consideration. 
This final criminal procedure issue relates also, although from an entirely 
different perspective, to a question involving antipsychotic medication: what 
substantive impacts can that medication have on the findings of neuroimag-
ing testing? (47, pp. 1109-1110). The answer to this question is self-
evidently critical to this entire area of law and policy, because of the alleged 
(or at least, perceived) "objectivity" of such evidence, and its expected ac-
ceptance by jurors: "The neuroimages of readily apparent brain damage give 
the jurors tangible proof of the disorder." (emphasis added) (48, p. 94). 
If antipsychotic drugging affects brain functioning-as it is supposed to 
do-then neuroimaging tests performed on drugged defendants need to be 
reconsidered. This is especially troubling, given the way that the use of neu-
roimaging testimony "reduces the psychosocial complexities" of the matter 
before the court, and "conflates representation with reality" (27, p. 300). If 
the use of medication-involuntary medication-distorts the "pretty pic-
tures," jurors' perceptions of "scientific reality" will be even more distorted. 
By way of example, Beaulieu (49, p. 52) notes that some scientists charac-
terize neuroimaging as simply "making pretty pictures." 
Questions to be Considered 
We can identify at least three questions that need to be thought about in 
this context: 
1) As Professor Reeves suggests (3), does such drugging distort the 
results? 
2) If so, should such tests be performed at all on this cohort of de-
fendants (or, should they only be performed after a more elabo-
rate form of informed consent is obtained), and 
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3) In either case, what, if anything, should jurors be told about 
this? 1 
Again, juror beliefs in the infallibility of neuroimaging have to be fa:-
tored into any analysis of the issues at hand. If jurors are inappropriately se-
duced by "Christmas tree phenomenon" evidence, and the pictures that are 
shown are not even an accurate depiction or representation of the defendant's 
brain at the time of the alleged crime-but rather, depict it in the aftermath of 
forced antipsychotic drugging-the entire enterprise becomes even more 
perilous. 
THE CLINICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Issues Arising at the Mitigation Stage 
Initial decisions regarding the necessity of neuroimaging in forensic 
criminal cases typically arise at the point at which mitigation efforts have 
been implemented. It is inevitable that, in some cases, the state attorney 
would request his or her own scan, and would likely call as an expert witness 
a radiologist to interpret the scan commissioned by the defense. This possi-
bility should be anticipated by those litigating such cases. It is the hope of the 
authors that, if the steps proposed in this article are taken, misuse of the 
scans will be minimized. The role of the forensic mental health expert in this 
process is critical. Careful planning and appropriate sequencing of evaluation 
and assessment techniques that occur need to be orchestrated in a systematic 
manner to best optimize the convergence of data for the purpose of mitiga-
tion (52, 53). We refer here both to mitigation in the context of the death 
penalty and in the context of other sentencing proceedings (29). 
A related issue concerns the use of medication to achieve competency 
and the potential impact on neuroimaging. For example, is it ethical to medi-
cate a defendant to achieve competency to consent to a procedure, or relat-
edly, remove medication for the purpose of the neuroimaging study? Or if 
the defendant is taking medication, how will it affect the results of neuroi-
maging? (53). 
1 By way of comparison, one of the authors (MLP) has criticized (50) the Supreme 
Court's decision in Shannon v. United States (51), holding that, as a matter offederal 
criminal procedure, the defendant had no right to have the jury informed about the 
possible consequences of a "not guilty by reason of insanity" verdict. 
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Exploring the Link Between Criminal Behavior 
and Neuropsychological Impairment 
The link between criminal behavior and neuropsychological impairment 
is a crucial aspect in criminal defense. Establishing a functional link between 
the deficits and event in question has important implications with regard to 
both the guilt (mental state at the time) and sentencing (mitigation) phases of 
the trial process (53). 
Violent behaviors due to brain impairment may be caused by many fac-
tors, including acute emotional state, repeated head trauma, toxic conditions 
caused by drugs, alcohol, medication and some heavy metals, seizure disor-
der, and degenerative conditions such as Alzheimer's Disease or dementia 
(54). Areas of the brain typically implicated in violent behaviors include 
those found in the ascending inhibitory component: the reticular activating 
system; limbic system, including structures such as the amygdala, hippocam-
pus and septum; the dorsomedial and anterior thalamic nuclei; ventromedial 
hypothalamus; and baso-orbital and posteriomedial frontal lobe (54). 
Frontal lobe impairment is the primary focus of linking neuropsy-
chological deficits and criminal behavior. This is because this brain area me-
diates between intellect and emotions. The ability to modulate and control 
aggression and anger emanating from the limbic system is frequently inter-
rupted and impaired when brain damage occurs. Bilateral damage to the 
premotor areas of the frontal lobes causes a syndrome characterized by apa-
thy, irritability, shallow affect, and cognitive changes such as perseveration 
with decreased ability to shift cognitive strategies and response sets. Verbal 
fluency and sustained attention are also affected. In other words, the frontal 
lobes are a regulatory system controlling elements of planning, organization, 
and intentional behavior. Individuals with frontal lobe deficits due to neuro-
logical trauma may frequently resemble someone with psychopathic behav-
iors if the history is not carefully reviewed (54). 
The Tasks of the Examining Forensic Neuropsychologist 
The first step on the part of the examining neuropsychologist is to care-
fully review available historical information from the defendant's life history 
that might potentially point to possible brain impairment. Examples would 
include documented head injuries or other neurological disease processes 
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such as epilepsy, learning disorders, ADHD, and low IQ. Psychiatric disor-
ders that indicate chemical and neurotransmitter abnormalities-such as bi-
polar disorder, intermittent explosive disorder, schizophrenia, and develop-
mental disorders such as autism may also be highly relevant (53). 
Any available neurological (EEG, MRI, SPECf, PET) scans or psycho-
logical testing are also important (MMPI-2, IQ, etc.) . These documents 
should be reviewed carefully and sequentially arranged in a timeline to 
chronicle the defendant's history leading to the alleged incident. 
Following review of the information, consultation with a medical expert 
such as a neurologist should be considered to best decide what neuroimaging 
tests should be done. The use of neuropsychological testing to further clarify 
any neurobehavioral deficits can be used to pinpoint functional deficits that 
correlate with behavioral issues related to both the criminal incident and pro-
posed neuroimaging study (53). 
Examples of appropriate neuropsychological test instruments would in-
clude tests that measure frontal lobe functioning or executive measures, in-
cluding the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, Categories Test, Trail Making A 
and B, the Continuous Performance Test (CPT), and the Stroop Test. These 
tests help identify deficits in cognitive shifting, planning, organizational 
strategies, impulsivity and attentional problems. 
Additionally, memory tests such as the Wechsler Memory Scale address 
deficits in immediate and delayed verbal and visual memory as well as 
working memory . Deficiencies in these tests may point to brain impairment 
that may have an impact on both the defendant's ability to work with coun-
sel, particularly in the context of describing the events that led up to the inci-
dent for which he was arrested and charged. 
Variations In Neurolmaglng Techniques 
Neuroimaging techniques vary with regard to sensitivity and specificity 
deficits. Whether structural (CT, MRI) or functional (PET, SPECT) ap-
proaches are employed will depend on the defendant's mental and neurologi-
cal history. Informed consent to neuroimaging takes on a new dimension in 
the context of a death eligible defendant. Standard protocols typically used in 
a medical office would include ensuring an awareness and appreciation of 
the procedure, potential risks and benefits from the procedure, and the ability 
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to make a decision regarding these issues. In the context of a death penalty 
eligible defendant, the use of the results from the procedure may likely be 
used to address the issues of guilt and sentencing. The purpose of the proce-
dures must be carefully explained by the mitigation team, particularly the 
defendant's attorney, in order to follow ethical guidelines and permit the de-
fendant to decide given all the information. Consent to a medical procedure 
such as a brain scan would entail a consideration of legal, medical and psy-
chological ethical guidelines. 
All procedures and their potential impact on the case outcome should be 
explained carefully to the defendant. In the event that the defendant is lim-
ited-as a result of intellectual or emotional impairment-and as a result is 
questionably competent to consent, the process of obtaining informed con-
sent can be challenging; both counsel and the expert witness must carefully 
review this process with the defendant and carefully document his responses. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues that we discuss in the heart of this article-access to experts, 
competence to consent, impact of antipsychotic medications, and clinical 
considerations-have all been the subject of intense academic and clinical 
interest, and the debate has not been without some vitriol. Yet, again, there 
has been virtually no consideration of these issues in the context of the type 
of testimony that is at the core of this article. 
Given the warning signals that have been raised by commentators as to 
the potentiality of juror misuse and misinterpretation of neuroimaging testi-
mony, it is, we think, all the more critical that we take seriously the issues we 
have raised here. We have sought to argue here that there are hidden land-
mines inevitably present when we think about the use of neuroimaging in 
criminal trials-landmines that can infect the fairness of the trial process it-
self. 
If an indigent criminal defendant is refused access to an independent ex-
pert in an area where juror OCS (28, pp. 22-33) may lead to uncritical ac-
ceptance of neuroimaging testimony because of that testimony's visual ap-
peal and its apparent lack of falsifiability, the fairness of the entire trial re-
mains in question. If no attention is paid to the difficult and complex ethical 
issues that should surface if the question of the defendant's competency to 
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consent to being tested is not raised, trial fairness is also a concern. And fi-
nally, if we ignore the reality that the neuroimaging evidence shown to jurors 
may not be an accurate depiction of the defendant's brain at the time of the 
offense- but rather, a depiction of his brain at a later time when his brain 
biochemistry has been altered by the imposition of medication-we willfully 
blind ourselves to the possibility (perhaps, "likelihood") that the database 
presented to the jury is potentially fatally flawed. 
On the other hand, an fMRI image may serve as a partial "marker" for 
certain behaviors, particularly when a specific brain image is related to a 
clinical evaluation or a set of neuropsychological tests. For example, assume 
that a brain image correlates very highly (90% or better) with a particular 
profile derived from neuropsychological testing and a clinical evaluation and 
diagnosis. A "marker" may then be established because the image, test re-
sults, and clinical evaluation are so consistent and not applicable to other 
profiles. In such cases, the presence of the marker could substantiate a pre-
sumption that person "X" possessed a particular set of characteristics, such 
as proneness toward violence, emotional instability to the point of lack of 
control, and cognitive incompetence, to explain the behavior in question. 
Hence, the image could, in conjunction with other more directly focused 
evaluations of behavior, reliably explicate cause and effect (52). 
We must stress that we are neither Luddites nor nihilists, and this article 
should not be interpreted as an anti-science screed, pining for the "good-old-
days" of crime detection (perhaps based on phrenology). Rather, we raise 
these issues because we sense the power of the evidence in question, and be-
cause of our fears that its "seductive dazzle" may hold jurors in thrall, lead-
ing them to uncritically believe that there are no limits to their understanding, 
a conceptual error that may lead to outcomes that are both factually and le-
gally inaccurate and constitutionally flawed. We hope that this article leads 
to more nuanced thought and behavior in this most important area of law, 
psychology and social policy. 
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A MODERN DAY WITCH HUNT: THE TROUBLING ROLE 
OF PSYCHOLOGISTS IN SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS 
Paul Good, Ph.D. and Jules Burstein, Ph.D. 
Sexually violent predator (SVP) laws have compromised the scientific 
and professional integrity of psychologists and failed to serve the public in-
terest. Psychologists on state SVP panels have become witch-finders, despite 
noble intentions of protecting public safety. Their testimony supporting the 
civil commitment of a small group of so-called "predators" relies upon ficti-
tious mental disorders and problematic actuarial formulae. Psychologists 
have become essential components of SVP laws that expend huge sums on 
new prisons, create impossible treatment situations for those who are civilly 
committed, indiscriminately demonize all sex offenders, and diminish the 
quality of American justice by sanctioning preventive detention. Psycholo-
gists should withhold their support for these laws and their civil commitment 
policies, not only because they promote a paradigm of detention based on 
risk status, but because they siphon away resources from programs and poli-
cies that address the more insidious and pervasive ways that society pro-
motes sexual violence. Recommendations by some critics to improve the 
quality of civil commitment evaluations, the validity of diagnostic and pre-
diction models, and the usefulness of court testimony cannot fix a broken 
system. In recognition of the ethical duty to do no harm and the failure of 
SVP laws to protect the public, we call on psychologists to resign from state 
SVP panels and to work toward more sensible solutions in adjudicating sex 
offenders. 
During the Salem witchcraft trials, 19 women and men were tried and 
executed in a community gripped by hysteria and by a legal system with too 
few checks and balances. Jurors were allowed to listen to panicky gossip and 
judges used vague standards of proof. Most egregious was the admission of 
invisible "spectral evidence," the extra-sensory experience of victims who 
had a vision of the accused as a witch. Ministers like Samuel Parris and 
Cotton Mather, instead of serving as a buffer against people's anxieties by 
critically examining the false claims of witchcraft, acted as "witch finders" 
(1). 
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